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THE IMAGINARY TRADEMARK PARODY CRISIS (AND 
THE REAL ONE) 
William McGeveran* 
Abstract: In the two decades since the Supreme Court protected a crude rap spoof from 
copyright liability in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., courts have grown to understand 
the great value of parodic expression in trademark cases as well. Today, plausible claims of 
parody almost always prevail over trademark rights in judicial rulings. This Article 
demonstrates that it is simply wrong to suggest, as commentators often do, that we face a 
crisis in the results of trademark parody cases. That distortion is harmful because it distracts 
reform efforts and it lends credence to overbroad assertions of trademarks against parody and 
other speech. Demand letters and other pre-litigation maneuvering by markholders exemplify 
the real crisis in the law of trademark parody. Reform should concentrate on making 
excessive threats against speech less effective. I argue that fast-lane defensive doctrines that 
reduce the burden of litigating parody cases, such as safe harbors and a broad artistic 
relevance test, are more important than perfecting substantive parody doctrine. Meanwhile, 
we should shout the truth from the rooftops: Markholders who sue legitimate parodies lose. 
Their threats are empty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We live in a golden age of modern pop parody. Two decades after the 
Supreme Court found a crude rap spoof worthy of consideration as fair 
use in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,1 this type of humor is now 
central to the American conversation.2 Earlier this year, both the fortieth 
anniversary of Saturday Night Live and the announcement that Jon 
Stewart was leaving the Daily Show became cultural milestones worthy 
of front-page news stories and endless retrospective analysis.3 Every 
news event is met with a parodic Twitter account, often within minutes.4 
A quick Google Image search illustrates how the combination of 
Photoshop and the web gives any smart aleck the ability to alter brand 
logos and publish the resulting takeoff to make a statement, or just a silly 
joke. In our consumer culture, ubiquitous and universally recognizable 
brands are among the juiciest targets for parody.5 
Meanwhile, this spread of parody coincides with the huge expansion 
of trademark law to confer much broader rights.6 Today, in contrast to 
1. 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994). 
2. See SIMON DENTITH, PARODY 159–64 (2000) (noting significant importance of parody in 
contemporary high and popular culture alike, while also noting the significance of parody at other 
historical periods). 
3. See, e.g., David Hinckley, ‘SNL’ Flourishes in 40th Anniversary Celebration, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Feb. 16, 2015, 10:23 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/tv/snl-kicks-off-
40th-anniversary-musical-performance-article-1.2116512; Dave Itzkoff, Williams Suspended, at 
Low Point in His Career; Stewart to Depart at High Point, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2015, at A1. And 
in both cases, rightly so: Tina Fey’s imitation of Sarah Palin was one of the seminal events in the 
2008 election, and one survey shows Stewart’s “fake news” program nearly tied with the New York 
Times as a news source and bested all other national newspapers. Where News Audiences Fit on the 
Political Spectrum, PEW RES. CENTER (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.journalism.org/interactives/ 
media-polarization/table/consume/ (reporting that thirteen percent of respondents “got news about 
politics and government in the previous week” from the Times and twelve percent from The Daily 
Show; the Wall Street Journal (ten percent) and the Washington Post (eight percent) lagged behind). 
4. See, e.g., Max Knoblauch, 18 Fake Twitter Accounts Still Proving Phony Is Funny, MASHABLE 
(June 3, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/06/03/best-fake-twitter-accounts/ (“Parody accounts are 
as much part of Twitter’s legacy and culture as hijacked hashtags and the Justin Bieber resistance 
army. . . . Like most topical jokes, the lifeline of a parody account usually lasts a short, awkward 
moment.”); Salvador Rodriguez, Twitter Parody Account Imitating New Microsoft CEO Causes 
Confusion, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2014) (“Microsoft named Satya Nadella its new CEO on Tuesday, 
causing numerous Twitter parody accounts to immediately spring up.”). 
5. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks As Language in the Pepsi 
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 960 (1993); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the 
Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999). 
6. See, e.g., William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 56–59 
(2008) [hereinafter McGeveran, Rethinking]; Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of 
Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1901–04 (2007).  
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earlier doctrine, “almost anything at all that is capable of carrying 
meaning” can be a trademark7—including packaging, product 
configurations, colors, sounds, and the “look and feel” of a product.8 
Simultaneously, liability can now arise not only when consumers are 
confused about the source of products but also when they misunderstand 
a range of vaguer relationships including “affiliation” and “approval,”9 
or even when the use “tarnishes” the trademark under dilution law.10 
One might therefore expect a flood of judicial opinions drowning 
parody in the wake of these broad rights, but it hasn’t happened. Simply 
put, true trademark parodies now almost always win in court. When 
parody-based defenses do fail, those decisions might be justified. 
Moreover, parody’s victory rate has increased over time. In the first 
years after the Campbell decision declared the importance of parody in 
1994, courts became somewhat more solicitous toward parodies but 
occasionally still found them liable for trademark infringement. By the 
time we started putting a “2” in front of the year, it became increasingly 
difficult to identify such losses. In the last decade, defeats for trademark 
parodies have become blue-moon rarities.11 
Despite these pro-parody outcomes in formal law, however, the 
situation on the ground is another matter. While there are few litigated 
cases, markholders routinely send cease-and-desist letters demanding the 
eradication of parodies aimed at their trademarks. Many parodists 
comply. Even though the letters often cite dated cases that no longer 
reflect current judicial views, they remain effective for reasons distinct 
from their legal merits. Even though parody wins in court, the route to 
get there is long and convoluted. Parodists are not necessarily aware of 
the favorable trends in the law. They do not have much leverage in pre-
litigation negotiations with markholders, and often they have less 
investment in their position as well. In these circumstances they choose 
to avoid significant costs of time and money they would incur even if 
7. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995). 
8. See id. (Coca-Cola’s bottle form, NBC’s three chimes, and the scent on a sewing thread); Two 
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764–67 (1992) (trade dress protection for distinctive 
Mexican restaurant); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 8:4.50 (4th ed. 2014) (noting protection for “the distinctive performing style of a 
rock music group” and “the overall ‘look’ of a line of greeting cards”). 
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012); see also Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant 
Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 423–27 (2010). 
10. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
11. For more on the strong trends toward protecting trademark parody in judicial opinions, see 
infra Part II. 
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they won a lawsuit.12 
Commentators have been slow to adjust. They continue to 
mischaracterize legal doctrine as bad for parody and focus their energies 
on perfecting judicial accuracy. This is the wrong approach. It tries to fix 
a problem that is both highly complex and comparatively tiny, while 
distorting public understanding about the actual state of the law. The 
resulting narrative of supposedly flawed parody doctrine supports 
unmeritorious demand letters. It thus exacerbates the more serious 
problem of pre-litigation threats. 
This Article seeks to reorient the discussion. Part I draws on lessons 
from the copyright decision in Campbell that are relevant to trademark 
law. Part II demonstrates the marked increase in judicial protection for 
parodies in trademark law since Campbell. Part III shows how sustaining 
the myth of bad outcomes for trademark parody in court encourages 
markholders to overstate their rights, undermines parodists in their 
responses, and distracts reformers from the real problem. Finally, Part 
IV proposes better responses to the high costs of adjudication that can 
make cease-and-desist demands effective. While Campbell shows how 
parody cases are usually difficult cases, certain broad reforms aimed at 
expressive uses more generally could reduce costs while continuing the 
favorable substantive treatment of parody we have seen since Campbell. 
I. THE LESSONS OF CAMPBELL 
Campbell concerned a parody “cover” of Roy Orbison’s classic song 
“Oh, Pretty Woman” by the rap group 2 Live Crew. The opening melody 
of the parody generally imitated the original, but its growling rap style 
was different from Orbison’s famous falsetto and the lyrics quickly 
departed from Orbison’s as well, for example by referring to a “big hairy 
woman” and a “two timin’ woman.”13 After the parody sold nearly a 
quarter of a million copies, the music publisher that owned the copyright 
to Orbison’s song sued 2 Live Crew and its record label for copyright 
infringement.14 Since copying was indisputable, the only real issue in the 
case was whether the parody was entitled to a fair use defense.15 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had ruled that 2 
12. See McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 6, at 62–64; infra notes 168–175 and accompanying 
text (discussing various systematic imbalances between markholders and parodists). 
13. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 595–96 (1994). 
14. Id. at 573. 
15. Id. at 574; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (codifying fair use defense to copyright 
infringement). 
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Live Crew’s commercial exploitation of the parody and copying of the 
“heart” of the original foreclosed fair use.16 The United States Supreme 
Court reversed, finding that parody fit neatly within the fair use 
defense’s purpose: preserving the ability of later expression to build on 
earlier work protected by intellectual property.17 In doing so, this 
copyright case offered indirect guidance for parody cases under 
trademark law. 
This Part highlights three lessons from Campbell that have particular 
importance for treatment of parody in trademark law. First, and most 
simply, Campbell acknowledges the societal value of even the silliest or 
most lowbrow parody as a protected form of speech. Second, Campbell 
shows how certain features of parody, particularly its inherent need to 
imitate, make these cases exceptionally tricky. Finally, Campbell 
advances a subtle argument about the relationship of defensive doctrines 
to the core purposes of an intellectual property regime—with somewhat 
different implications in trademark law than in copyright. 
A. Parody Is Valuable 
First, Campbell tells us that parody is valuable discourse. Over the 
last twenty years, as parody and related humorous forms of commentary 
increasingly moved to center stage in American culture,18 courts have 
become much more receptive to arguments that parody deserves special 
protection. Before Campbell, this position was not obvious. The Sixth 
Circuit’s copyright decision in Campbell itself was dismissive of 2 Live 
Crew’s parody and indulged strong presumptions of liability.19 In 
trademark, there had been important lower-court opinions like L.L. 
Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.20 that praised even a pornographic 
parody of a wholesome Maine-based clothing retailer as a contribution 
to discourse.21 But there were also plenty of reported trademark cases 
16. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1438–39 (6th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 510 U.S. 
569 (1994). 
17. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575–76. 
18. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. 
19. 972 F.2d at 1435 (“Much of entertainment involves parodies in the popular sense, but [17 
U.S.C. § 107] does not direct the courts to conclude that all such parodies are fair uses.”). 
20. 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987). 
21. Id. at 34 (noting that trademark parodies remind us “that business and product images need 
not always be taken too seriously . . . [and] that we are free to laugh at the images and associations 
linked with the mark”); see also, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., 
Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[P]arody and satire are deserving of substantial freedom—
both as entertainment and as a form of social and literary criticism.” (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Berlin v. E.C. Pubs., Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964))). 
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showing little regard for speech values in parody.22 
It is impossible to say precisely how much Campbell caused the 
subsequent change in attitude, and how much it merely reflected 
increased appreciation for the value of parody in society at large. 
Regardless, Campbell marks a mid-1990s turning point. The respect the 
Supreme Court showed for a crude rap spoof served as an example for 
lower courts. The majority opinion’s author, Justice Souter, certainly did 
not seem to find 2 Live Crew’s rendition of “Pretty Woman” very 
amusing,23 and his wry summary of the song’s parodic character 
sounded like something in the New York Review of Books (“2 Live Crew 
juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes true, 
with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from 
paternal responsibility.”).24 The opinion makes it clear that differences in 
taste, culture, or sense of humor must not stop courts from safeguarding 
the social benefits parody provides and protecting them from intellectual 
property liability. The Supreme Court quoted a warning issued by Judge 
Leval, then a district court judge, in a case involving trademark parody: 
“First Amendment protections do not apply only to those who speak 
clearly, whose jokes are funny, and whose parodies succeed.”25 
22. See, e.g., Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402–03 (8th Cir. 1987) (granting 
preliminary injunction for Mutual of Omaha against “Mutant of Omaha” parodist); Walt Disney 
Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that defendant infringed Walt 
Disney Productions’ trademarks on its cartoon characters by depicting parodies of them in adult 
“counter-culture” comic books, and denying a fair use defense where a “parodist has appropriated a 
greater amount of the original work than is necessary to ‘recall or conjure up’ the object of his 
satire”); Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach’s Coal. for Chicago, 856 F. Supp. 472, 477 
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (issuing a preliminary injunction to prevent defendant from incorporating Brach’s 
logo into protest organization’s promotional materials); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Pac. 
Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1454, 1463–64 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (enjoining defendants from using 
“Hard Rain Cafe” imitation of “Hard Rock Cafe” trademarks referring to the weather in Seattle); 
Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (granting a 
preliminary injunction against defendant who parodied the “Coca-Cola” trademark to read “Enjoy 
Cocaine” while noting the parody was a “clear indication of defendant’s predatory intent, however 
humorous defendant consider[ed] it”).  
23. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (comparing “social 
benefit” provided by parody to that from “less ostensibly humorous forms of criticism” (emphasis 
added)); id. at 582 (“Whether . . . parody is in good taste or bad does not and should not matter to 
fair use.”); id. at 583 (“[W]e might not assign a high rank to the parodic element here . . . .”).  
24. Id. at 583. 
25. Id. (quoting Yankee Publ’g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992) (Leval, J.)); see also id. at 582–83 (“[I]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons 
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a work], outside of the 
narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss 
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new 
language in which their author spoke.” (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 
239, 251 (1903) (Holmes, J.))). 
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Campbell did not add much of its own flowery quotable language 
praising the social worth of parody, although later trademark decisions 
and scholarship filled that void. It let the analysis, recognizing and 
favoring parody at every turn, speak for itself. As a statement from our 
highest court, Campbell stands as a landmark in the growing 
appreciation for parody in intellectual property doctrine. That growth has 
spread to trademark law. As David Simon has documented extensively, 
courts in trademark cases often cite Campbell to demonstrate the cultural 
value of parody as a particularly powerful form of expression.26 
B. Parody Is Tricky 
The second lesson of Campbell concerns the difficulty of 
safeguarding parody. Since Campbell clearly recognized the value of 
parody, one might assume that the doctrine the Court used to protect it 
might be fairly simple. The Campbell opinion repeatedly warns that this 
is far from true. Rather, “[t]he task is not to be simplified with bright-
line rules.”27 That caution applies in trademark cases as much as in 
copyright. 
The Court took pains to emphasize that fair use for parody did not 
mean that “anyone who calls himself a parodist can skim the cream and 
get away scot free.”28 In its analysis of the third fair use factor,29 
concerning the “amount and substantiality” of the parodist’s copying,30 
the majority opinion was especially sensitive to the danger that false 
parody claims might offer a fig leaf for infringing activity, and suggested 
that courts look at “what else the parodist did” beyond copying the 
original.31 Justice Kennedy concurred primarily to express even greater 
reservations about what he saw as the risk of “profiteers,”32 warning that 
courts “must take care to ensure that not just any commercial takeoff is 
rationalized post hoc as a parody.”33 
26. David A. Simon, The Confusion Trap: Rethinking Parody in Trademark Law, 88 WASH. L. 
REV. 1021, 1058–59 (2013). 
27. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. 
28. Id. at 589. 
29. Id. at 586–89. 
30. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2012). 
31. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589. 
32. Id. at 598 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
33. Id. at 600; cf. Yankee Publ’g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992) (rejecting argument in a trademark case that “the joke is an after-the-fact contrivance 
designed to camouflage a piracy of [plaintiff’s] goodwill”). 
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Of course, trademark rights do not allow markholders to control every 
drop of the “cream” in their brands. Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna 
have demonstrated persuasively that much of the concern about “free 
riding” on consumer association with a trademark lacks both theoretical 
and empirical support.34 Thus, unlicensed uses of a trademark that draw 
somewhat on its selling power still may be acceptable, particularly when 
other interests are at stake. Even in their modern expanded form, 
trademark rights are subject to doctrinal limitations such as the bar on 
protection for functional features35 or the nominative use doctrine36 that 
allow defendants to imitate trademarks for their own purposes. Other 
unlicensed uses are vindicated by a lack of likely consumer confusion. 
These various escape valves apply to many expressive uses of 
trademarks, often including parody but reaching much more broadly. 
Nonetheless, worry about “skimming the cream” through excessive 
imitation makes trademark parody cases particularly difficult. As in 
copyright, courts in trademark parody cases carefully note that any 
defense for parody is contingent, not absolute.37 If we thought that every 
claim of parody should prevail automatically over intellectual property 
rights, then Campbell would not be a landmark case. All observers agree 
that some plausibly parodic imitations may infringe trademarks. Suppose 
I try to sell a brown carbonated soda as “Popsi.” It is easy to imagine me 
arguing that I was merely mocking a better-known soda brand with my 
whimsical play on words. I should lose this argument on the merits. But 
it is not so easy to differentiate such illegitimate use of the PEPSI mark 
from a true parody like “Chewy Vuiton” dog toys that imitate Louis 
Vuitton luxury handbags.38 Because we easily envision trumped-up 
parody arguments, we must wrestle with two thorny follow-up 
questions. What counts as parody? What proportion of the original may 
a parody imitate in pursuit of its aim? Both inquiries swiftly become 
entangled in complexity. 
First, a court must decide when the facts actually present parody 
34. Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137, 137, 166–
67 (2010).  
35. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
36. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308–09 (9th Cir. 1992). 
37. See, e.g., Lyons P’ship v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[C]onfusion 
resulting from a parody is not an affirmative defense to a trademark infringement claim but is 
instead an additional factor that should be considered.”); Dardenne v. MoveOn.org, No. 14-00150-
SDD-SCR, 2014 WL 1364854, at *3 (M.D. La. 2014) (“[P]arody does not provide an absolute cloak 
of protection from a claim of trademark infringement . . . .”). 
38. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260–61 (4th Cir. 
2007). 
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questions that merit more careful analysis. Campbell presents the 
threshold question as “whether a parodic character may reasonably be 
perceived.”39 Non-parody trademark doctrines likewise engage in this 
exercise of determining initial eligibility for a defense. For example, the 
first prong of the nominative use test, which shields the use of a mark 
simply to refer to a brand or company, asks whether the defendant’s 
communication requires such a use of the trademark.40 A related line of 
cases going back to the Second Circuit’s decision in Rogers v. 
Grimaldi41 asks about the artistic nature of the alleged infringer’s work 
and the “artistic relevance” of the trademark to that work.42 Discerning 
parody can require determinations about the intent of a use, and these 
questions can be difficult to decide at the beginning of an analysis. A 
generous standard like the one articulated in Campbell would treat uses 
of trademarks as potential parodies whenever there is any indication of 
such character, but doing so may also force a court to be more searching 
in its subsequent inquiry. 
Some courts find it even more difficult to identify the presence of 
parody because of an apparent suggestion in Campbell that the 
intellectual property itself—for our purposes, the trademark—must be 
the subject of the comedic ridicule.43 As others have noted, it can be 
impossible to discern whether a purported parody takes aim at a brand 
rather than making a broader point about the culture at large—and very 
often it will do some of each.44 More fundamentally, it is not always 
clear why or how parody that mocks the trademark (or its owner) should 
be treated differently from satire or other expression that does not.45 
39. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994). 
40. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308. 
41. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
42. Id. at 999–1001 (finding no Lanham Act claim by famed dancer Ginger Rogers where 
defendants distributed film about fictional cabaret performers titled “Ginger and Fred,” because the 
title had artistic relevance to the film’s substance); see also Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 
F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding Aqua’s song “Barbie Girl” did not infringe Mattel’s 
trademark because “the use of Barbie in the song title clearly is relevant to the underlying work, 
namely, the song itself”).  
43. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81. 
44. See Charles E. Colman, Trademark Law and the Prickly Ambivalence of Post-Parodies, 163 
U. PA. L. REV. 11, 11 (2014); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Parody as Brand, 47 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 473, 500 (2013) (noting courts might ask “is a subsidiary purpose to make fun of the 
plaintiff enough, or must it be the primary focus of the defendant’s use? How confident must we be 
that it is a parody?”); Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic Than the Real Thing: 
Parody Lawsuits Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 1000–03 (2004) (reviewing judicial 
mishandling of the parody/satire distinction in trademark cases). 
45. See Keller & Tushnet, supra note 44, at 1000 (“If a joke is recognizable as a joke, consumers 
are unlikely to be confused, and whether the butt of the joke is society at large, or the trademark 
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While the “need” to borrow a trademark may be reduced when it is not 
the target, the trademark still may be an important component of 
communicating messages effectively. Literary theorists who have 
written about parody have resisted a narrow definition that limits the 
form only to works that aim their criticism at the original. At the outset 
of her classic work A Theory of Parody, Linda Hutcheon explains that 
“[p]arody . . . is a form of imitation, but imitation characterized by ironic 
inversion, not always at the expense of the parodied text.”46 She offers 
examples of parodies by Max Ernst on Michelangelo’s Pieta and Ezra 
Pound on Dante’s Commedia as illustrations of such parodic inversion, 
but these would not qualify under a stringent division between parody 
and satire sometimes attributed to Campbell. 
On close reading, the Campbell majority opinion does not actually 
draw such definitive lines between parody and satire or other humor. 
When discussing imitation that aims at some target other than the one 
imitated, the Court opines that a defendant’s interest in using protected 
intellectual property (IP) “diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish)” 
and “requires justification.”47 Perhaps the claim to fair use is not as 
likely, says Campbell—but there may still be one. Lower courts have not 
always been so sensitive and have sometimes been clumsy in applying 
the “parody” label.48 Even though Campbell avoids the inflexible 
dichotomy with satire, any identification of parody nonetheless presents 
interpretive problems that courts must resolve at the outset of the 
analysis. Campbell does not create any special doctrinal treatment for 
parody, however; it simply analyzes the broadly applicable four-factor 
test for copyright fair use with sensitivity to a parody fact pattern. 
The second challenge concerns degree. How much of a plaintiff’s 
trademark may a defendant imitate? While discussing the third copyright 
fair use factor, the Campbell Court articulated very general standards to 
answer this question: “[T]he parody must be able to ‘conjure up’ at least 
enough of [the] original to make the object of its critical wit 
recognizable. . . . Once enough has been taken to assure identification, 
how much more is reasonable will depend” on a number of case-specific 
considerations.49 (Campbell answers many questions about parody with 
owner in particular, ought not to matter at all.”). 
46. LINDA HUTCHEON, A THEORY OF PARODY 6 (1985); see also DENTITH, supra note 2, at 9–21 
(exploring the definition of parody at length and concluding that it should be understood more 
broadly than merely an imitation of a specific preceding work). 
47. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81. 
48. See Keller & Tushnet, supra note 44, at 1000–03. 
49. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588 (citations omitted). 
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some variation of “it depends.” Indeed, in the case itself the Supreme 
Court remanded this issue rather than settle it.)50 
A number of trademark doctrines rely on a similar Goldilocks 
calculation: not too much and not too little, but just right. One well-
known formulation for judging parody comes from Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. 
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group,51 a case involving a parody 
of the iconic Cliffs Notes study guides by the 1980s humor publication 
Spy Magazine.52 The court used likelihood of confusion as the 
touchstone: 
A parody must convey two simultaneous—and contradictory—
messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the original 
and is instead a parody. To the extent that it does only the 
former but not the latter, it is not only a poor parody but also 
vulnerable under trademark law, since the customer will be 
confused.53 
Other trademark doctrines try to measure degree, not by referring to 
consumer confusion, but by evaluating the necessity of the borrowing to 
the purpose of the unlicensed use. So, a nominative use analysis of 
parody, in its second prong, would require that “only so much of the 
mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the 
product or service.”54 Rogers v. Grimaldi measures the trademark’s 
“artistic relevance” to the underlying message.55 More recently the Ninth 
Circuit has expressed the Rogers standard in terms more definitive for a 
judge and more favorable for a parodist: the “artistic relevance” must 
simply be greater than zero.56 
50. Id. at 589 (“As to the music, we express no opinion whether repetition of the bass riff is 
excessive copying, and we remand to permit evaluation of the amount taken, in light of the song’s 
parodic purpose and character, its transformative elements, and considerations of the potential for 
market substitution sketched more fully below.”). 
51. 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989). 
52. Id. at 491–93 (vacating an injunction against “Spy Notes,” a parody of Cliffs Notes that 
imitated the study guide’s cover and purported to summarize and analyze trendy 1980s novels in 
Cliffs Notes’ “flat, straightforward, academic style”). 
53. Id. at 494 (emphasis in original); see also Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free 
Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 203 (2004) (praising the Cliffs Notes court for its result 
because “[t]here was no likelihood that a purchaser would be misled”); cf. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 
588 (noting that 2 Live Crew copied only the memorable portions of the original “Pretty Woman”—
“the characteristic opening bass riff” and “the words of the first line”). 
54. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992). 
55. 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
56. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008); Mil-
Spec Monkey, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., No. 14-CV-02361-RS, 2014 WL 6655844, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2014). 
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When judging degree, as when identifying the presence of parody, the 
nature of the inquiry makes the job more difficult than under otherwise 
similar trademark doctrines. Campbell and Cliffs Notes, concerned with 
preventing cream-skimming, require complicated judgments about how 
much source material a parodist needs. Rogers, concerned only with 
ensuring that the defendant’s claim to be engaged in expression is 
minimally adequate, requires much less care to apply. 
In sum, the second lesson from Campbell is the caution that 
developing parody-specific defenses will be difficult, and the resulting 
rules inevitably will be complicated. The difficulty of clearly identifying 
true parodies, and the doctrinal terror of cream-skimming, force this 
result. As we shall see below, this inherent complexity also suggests it 
will be more effective to handle parody cases with broader speech-
protective doctrines that encompass both parody and other expression 
rather than a narrow parody-only rule—just as Campbell did in 
copyright law. 
C. Parody Doctrine Should Serve the Purpose of IP 
Finally, Campbell includes a wise and nuanced discussion of the 
relationship between defensive doctrines for parody and the underlying 
purpose of an intellectual property regime. This, in turn, prompts 
consideration of the ways its lessons may differ when applied to the 
distinct purposes of trademark law. 
Parody cases often will involve claims under both copyright and 
trademark law. But they should not necessarily be handled the same 
way. When Justice Kennedy wrung his hands about profiteering in 
Campbell,57 he cited the famous (to IP lawyers) Walt Disney 
Productions v. Air Pirates case.58 In Air Pirates, Disney sued to prevent 
an “underground” comic book’s “rather bawdy depiction of the Disney 
characters as active members of a free thinking, promiscuous, drug 
ingesting counterculture.”59 There the court affirmed summary judgment 
rejecting a copyright fair use defense,60 but refused to affirm the 
trademark claims because likelihood of confusion had not been 
57. 510 U.S. at 598 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
58. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978). 
59. Id. at 753 (quoting Note, Parody, Copyrights and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 
564, 571, 582 (1976)). 
60. Id. at 758 (“Because the amount of defendant’s copying exceeded permissible levels [under 
copyright fair use doctrine], summary judgment was proper.”). 
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demonstrated.61 That is, Air Pirates found the imitation infringed 
copyright but not trademark, because of the different purposes of each 
regime. Justice Kennedy’s reliance on Air Pirates may have 
strengthened his point in a copyright case like Campbell, but it also 
shows that trademark law cannot follow Campbell blindly.62 
Parody directly threatens the central restrictions created by copyright 
law. As its name suggests, the Copyright Act confers rights over copies. 
Those broad exclusive rights include the ability to control a work’s 
reproduction, adaptation, distribution, and display.63 These rights also 
extend to derivative works that unlawfully duplicate aspects of a 
copyrighted original.64 Mere imitation automatically infringes upon 
several of these core exclusive rights.65 Thus every parody is a copyright 
violation at first blush, albeit one that could be excused by an affirmative 
defense such as fair use.66 
Parody does not clash with the motivations and mechanisms of 
trademark law nearly as directly as it undermines the animating purposes 
of copyright law.67 Trademark law does not prohibit every imitation, but 
only those imitations that cause certain types of consumer confusion.68 
Moreover, the reason trademark law aims to prevent confusion is an 
additional degree of remove from the copying itself, because confusion 
is only a method to identify situations that cause particular subsequent 
harms such as diversion of good will or distortion of market incentives.69 
61. Id. at 759–60. 
62. Justice Kennedy also cited D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 
110, 112–15 (N.D. Ga. 1984), a case that found both types of IP right infringed but paid only 
perfunctory attention to parody arguments in the trademark context.  
63. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
64. See id. § 103(a); Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF THE U.S.A. 209, 209 (1983); Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty Math: The 
Economics of Legalizing The Grey Album, 59 ALA. L. REV. 345, 346 (2008). 
65. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574–75 n.4 (1994). 
66. If indeed fair use is best understood as an affirmative defense in copyright law. See Lydia 
Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90 WASH. L. REV. 685 (2015). 
67. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 44, at 501 (“Unlike copyright, which is designed to prevent 
copying and to give copyright owners control over the use of the work itself, trademark law cares 
only about the brand-product connection in the minds of consumers and how that might affect 
producer incentives.”). 
68. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (“[T]rademark law, by 
preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, reduce[s] the customer’s costs of 
shopping and making purchasing decisions.” (citation omitted)). 
69. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 806 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The limited 
purpose of trademark protections set forth in the Lanham Trade–Mark Act is to avoid confusion in 
the marketplace by allowing a trademark owner to prevent others from duping consumers into 
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Unlike copyright, where parody inherently infringes and then must be 
covered by a defense, most parodies could be found not to violate 
trademark law in the first place.70 While defensive doctrines for speech 
under trademark law serve other vital purposes, such as reducing 
litigation costs, they are not inherently necessary to absolve infringing 
use as they would be in copyright law. 
At the same time, parody also advances the fundamental purposes of 
copyright, because it too contributes artistic expression to the 
marketplace of ideas. Campbell reached back to classic statements of 
principle by Justice Story and Lord Ellenborough to explore this 
“inherent tension” between protecting copyright and preserving the 
capacity for later creators to draw on earlier works.71 Quoting its own 
Stewart v. Abend72 decision from a few years previously, the Supreme 
Court warned that a copyright statute without sufficient provision for fair 
use would “stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to 
foster.”73 
Speech values are important in trademark law too, but they do not 
overlap much with the original economic reasons for protecting 
trademarks. At the time of Campbell, it was still commonplace for courts 
to consider trademark law a form of commercial speech regulation 
nearly beyond the scope of any First Amendment considerations.74 
There is greater understanding now that many unlicensed uses of 
trademarks implicate vital speech values that must be reconciled with 
trademark protection.75 Judge Leval has argued persuasively that those 
concerns ought to be integrated within the structure of trademark 
buying a product they mistakenly believe is sponsored by the trademark owner.”); William 
McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 275–
77 (2013) (“Likelihood of consumer confusion is supposed to be a heuristic that indicates the 
probability of subsequent harm to the consumer and the market.”). 
70. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 6:14 (“Copyright law gives the author the right to prevent 
copying of the copyrighted work in any medium. Trademark law prevents the use of a similar mark 
on such goods or services as would probably cause confusion . . . . Thus, [reproducing] a trademark 
does not necessarily constitute trademark infringement.” (citations omitted)); Leval, supra note 53, 
at 189 (“The trademark law itself is fashioned to protect free-speech interests that may justify uses 
of a trademark by persons other than its owner.”). 
71. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575–77 (1994). 
72. 495 U.S. 207 (1990). 
73. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (quoting Stewart, 495 U.S. at 236). 
74. See Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging 
Rationales for the Protection of the Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 164–66 (1982). 
75. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1005 (2d Cir. 1989); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing 
First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381, 381 (2008); Kozinski, supra 
note 5, at 960. 
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doctrine rather than operating through an external constitutional 
limitation.76 A number of scholars have suggested that the ability to 
reconstitute brands has become a central requirement of our democracy, 
and even our capacity for self-definition, in an increasingly 
commercialized marketplace of ideas.77 Note, however, that these speech 
concerns come from outside the structure of trademark law rather than 
growing organically from its own internal logic as they do in copyright. 
Some aspects of parody may be meaningful in both copyright and 
trademark law, although in slightly different ways. For example, 
Campbell emphasizes how unlikely it is that a parody would serve as a 
market substitute for the original.78 Because it is ridiculous to claim that 
a purchaser interested in Roy Orbison’s version of “Oh Pretty Woman” 
would happily accept 2 Live Crew’s version instead, it is difficult to 
argue that the parody caused meaningful market harm to the copyright 
owner. While that is one aspect of the rights conferred by copyright, in 
trademark law it is closer to the whole enchilada. As just discussed, 
trademark cares deeply about market substitution, not only in its 
defenses but in its core liability provisions. Imagine a comparable 
trademark claim that consumers somehow confused the 2 Live Crew 
version for the Orbison one; the unlikelihood of such confusion 
demonstrates that a parody can coexist with an original trademark and 
do it no real market harm.79 
All this goes to show that, even on identical facts, copyright and 
trademark should not necessarily treat parody the same way. The first 
two lessons of Campbell—that parody is socially valuable but difficult 
to pin down doctrinally—apply equally to both forms of IP. In contrast, 
the third lesson should lead courts in trademark cases to distinguish 
Campbell rather than following it, because Campbell itself emphasizes 
the important link between the purposes of copyright and the purposes of 
parody. 
76. Leval, supra note 53; William McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals for Trademark Law, 18 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1205, 1211–14 (2008). 
77. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004); Keith Aoki, How the World Dreams 
Itself to Be American: Reflections on the Relationship Between the Expanding Scope of Trademark 
Protection and Free Speech Norms, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 523, 523–26 (1997); Colman, supra 
note 44; Dreyfuss, supra note 5, at 397–99; Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 489, 489–99 (2006); Kozinski, supra note 5; Ramsey, supra note 75, at 381. 
78. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.  
79. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 9. 
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II. JUDGES GETTING IT RIGHT 
A. Parody Cases Are Rare and Losses Are Rarer 
Many cases before Campbell dripped contempt for the parodist, spoke 
in stirring terms of a markholder’s “property rights,” and gave short 
shrift to First Amendment arguments.80 For example, in 1977 a district 
court issued a preliminary injunction against a defendant selling diaper 
bags that parodied the luxury GUCCI mark by using a “GUCCHI GOO” 
logo; the court declared that the “fact that the offending product was 
intended only as a joke is of no consequence” and concluded that the 
trademark should be “protected from such ridicule.”81 A 1972 decision 
granted Coca-Cola a preliminary injunction against posters altering its 
trademark slogan to read “Enjoy Cocaine.”82 The court determined that 
“one would have to be a visitor from another planet not to recognize 
immediately the familiar ‘Coca’ in its stylized script and accompanying 
words, colors and design” and that this similarity, far from being 
justified by the parodic character of the use, was actually “a clear 
indication of defendant’s predatory intent, however humorous defendant 
considers it.”83 
Cases after Campbell seldom disregarded speech concerns so readily. 
I have argued repeatedly that most types of expressive uses of 
trademarks now do very well when they reach a final judicial 
determination.84 (The same generally may be said of copyright law.)85 
80. See, e.g., Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he 
protection afforded by the First Amendment does not give Novak license to infringe the rights of 
Mutual. Mutual’s trademarks are a form of property.”); Am. Exp. Co. v. Vibra Approved Labs. 
Corp., No. 87 CIV. 8840 (CSH), 1989 WL 39679, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1989) (denying a 
preliminary injunction based on trademark infringement, but granting an injunction based on 
dilution where defendant mimicked plaintiff American Express’s charge card and accompanying 
“DON’T LEAVE HOME WITHOUT IT” slogan with similar-looking novelty condom holder with 
accompanying slogan “Never Leave Home Without It,” noting that “defendants’ condom card 
cannot be shrugged off as a mere bawdy jest, unreachable by any legal theory.”); Reddy Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. Envtl. Action Found., Inc., No. 77–1105, 1977 WL 23197, at *3–4 (D.D.C. Nov. 11, 1977) 
decision supplemented by 477 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1979) (“Assuming the validity of this 
trademark, a . . . proper characterization of the case is that it pits plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment right 
not to be deprived of its property without due process against defendant’s First Amendment right of 
free speech, and requires a delicate balancing of the conflicting interests.”). 
81. Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838, 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
82. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
83. Id. at 1187. 
84. See William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267, 2275 
(2010) [hereinafter McGeveran, Reform Act]; McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 6, at 59–61. 
85. See Neil W. Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 754 (2011) 
(finding copyright defendants almost always win cases where courts find transformative use); 
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Nowhere is that trend toward protecting expression more pronounced 
than in trademark decisions about parody. These days, judges more often 
show impatience with humorless markholders than with puckish 
parodists. When Mattel, maker of the BARBIE doll, brought a trademark 
suit related to the parodic song “Barbie Girl,” Judge Kozinski 
characterized the case as “Speech–Zilla meets Trademark Kong”86 and 
warned Mattel, “[w]ith fame often comes unwanted attention.”87 
Unfortunately, when scholarship and other commentary analyze 
trademark parody they too often continue to cite old cases, and 
particularly pre-Campbell decisions. These analyses frequently suggest 
that courts today give insufficient protection to trademark parodies. 
That’s incorrect, and I think it’s quite harmful. This Part supports the 
observation that courts now favor trademark parodies, while the next 
Part will elaborate on two deleterious effects of spreading this false 
rumor.88 
Few parody cases go to court, fewer reach a judicial determination, 
and fewer still result in losses for the parodist. Yet many commentators 
continue to write as if markholders routinely sue parodists and often win. 
For example, on the second page of a recent article that goes on to make 
a number of excellent points, Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley 
summarize their overall themes with these two inaccuracies.89 As they 
characterize it, “[p]arodies and their close kin, satires, are common in 
popular culture. So, too, are lawsuits filed against those parodies by irate 
trademark owners.”90 If there are many parody suits filed, however, 
almost all of them must settle before a judge ever considers them, 
because the number of decisions hardly suggests a “common” 
occurrence. Dogan and Lemley also state that “courts have struggled 
with the evaluation of parody under trademark law. While many 
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2550 (2009) 
(“Notwithstanding the Court’s unwillingness in Campbell to presume that parodies are fair, every 
subsequent parody case has been adjudged a fair use.”); David A. Simon, Reasonable Perception 
and Parody in Copyright Law, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 779, 793 (finding very high win rates in cases 
where courts identified the alleged copyright infringement as a parody). 
86. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2002). 
87. Id. at 899. 
88. See infra Part III (explaining how the narrative that trademark doctrine disfavors parody 
strengthens markholders’ overblown claims in cease-and-desist letters and distracts reform efforts 
from the actual problem of administrative costs). 
89. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 44, at 474. 
90. Id. A few pages later, discussing “cases that are about parodies featured in magazines, 
movies, TV shows, Twitter feeds, or any of a variety of other uses that don’t involve branding,” id. 
at 478, Dogan and Lemley repeat these characterizations, id. at 478 n.27 (“There are an alarming 
number of such cases, some of them successful.”). 
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trademark courts have protected parodies, there are a surprising number 
of cases that hold obvious parodies illegal.”91 As we shall see, however, 
the authors have not discovered any previously unknown trove of post-
Campbell losses beyond the small numbers noted above. Both of these 
are introductory framing remarks, not the meat of their analysis.92 But 
framing matters a great deal, as I shall argue below, and both of these 
frames are wrong. Actual trademark litigation over parody is rare; losses 
are rarer. 
To begin, it is important to emphasize how few trademark cases 
explicitly turn on concepts of parody. The methodology of Simon’s 
study counted judicial decisions that both cited Campbell and discussed 
trademark law; he identified just twenty-three such cases.93 By definition 
his carefully-derived sample begins when Campbell was issued in March 
1994, and it ends as of January 30, 2011.94 That is fewer than one and a 
half decided cases a year since Campbell. Using Simon’s methodology, I 
identified just four more parody cases in federal courts from the time he 
stopped counting in 2011 through 2014.95 A more selective historical 
account by Anthony L. Fletcher, published in 2010, discussed fourteen 
parody decisions from the decade after Campbell, most of them 
overlapping with Simon’s list.96 Scholarship that is not targeted toward 
91. Id. 
92. I confess that I, too, may have chosen my words poorly at times and given the wrong 
impression about parody’s treatment in court. See McGeveran, Reform Act, supra note 84, at 2308 
(“These sorts of uses of trademarks give rise to a surprising number of disputes.”). Even then, 
however, I generally talk in terms of “disputes” rather than “cases,” thereby encompassing both 
litigated cases and the more common phenomenon of pre-litigation demand letters, see infra notes 
146–157 and accompanying text, which is a more accurate account. 
93. Simon, supra note 26, at 1100.  
94. Id. at 1099. 
95. Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 25 F. Supp. 3d 865, 902 (E.D. Va. 2014), rev’d, No. 14-
1568, 2015 WL 2372675 (4th Cir. May 19, 2015) (blog posts referring to NAACP as “National 
Association for the Abortion of Colored People”); Dardenne v. MoveOn.org, No. 14-00150-SDD-
SCR, 2014 WL 1364854 (M.D. La. 2014) (billboard criticizing governor’s health policy using 
parody of state slogan); Farah v. Esquire Magazine, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 29, 40–41 (D.D.C. 2012), 
aff’d, 736 F.3d 528 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (blog post ridiculing publication of book questioning President 
Obama’s birthplace); CCA & B, LLC v. F + W Media Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (N.D. Ga. 2011) 
(parody of Elf on a Shelf holiday book). The appellate decision affirming the district court in Farah 
does not count separately under Simon’s methodology because it does not cite Campbell. See 
Simon, supra note 26, at 1099. Also consistent with Simon’s methodology, id. at 1099–100, I 
disregarded trademark cases that cited Campbell for some reason but did not involve parody 
analysis. See, e.g., Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2013); Arrow Prods., Ltd. v. 
Weinstein Co., No. 13-5488, 2014 WL 4211350 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2014). 
96. Anthony L. Fletcher, The Product with the Parody Trademark: What’s Wrong with Chewy 
Vuiton?, 100 TRADEMARK REP. 1091, 1127 (2010) (introducing section reviewing twelve cases and 
cross-referencing earlier discussion of two others). 
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parody finds similarly small numbers: in an empirical study of 331 
district court decisions from a five-year period starting in 2000, Barton 
Beebe identified only seven cases where the defendant even raised a 
parody-related defense.97 All of these counts could be critiqued over 
their varying definitions of parody or other particulars, but my goal here 
is not to determine the absolute number of judicial parody decisions, 
only to show that it is small by any measure. 
It may be dangerous to generalize too broadly from small numbers, 
but it is quite safe to say that losses for alleged trademark parodies are 
unusual. Simon found three losses.98 All three decisions were issued 
before 2000; one came out just twenty-four days after Campbell and 
presented the results of a bench trial that had already been completed the 
year before.99 Beebe identified one parody loss in his five-year study 
period.100 Of the four recent decisions I found using Simon’s 
methodology, the parodist lost in one,101 which was forcefully reversed 
on appeal; I analyze that case further below.102 
By my count, Dogan and Lemley cite a total of twelve decided court 
cases where uses claimed as trademark parodies lost.103 Five came out 
before Campbell, and the authors particularly highlight the 1972 “Enjoy 
Cocaine” case at several points without noting its age.104 Two of the 
97. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1581, 1595 n.65 (2006). Because he was selecting only district court cases that 
relied on the multifactor likelihood of confusion test, id. at 1649–50, Beebe might have excluded 
other cases during this period that considered parody without engaging in confusion analysis. 
Nevertheless, seven out of 331 cases is an extremely small proportion. 
98. See Simon, supra note 26, at 1062–66. The three cases are Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. 
Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999), Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th 
Cir. 1998), and Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, 850 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
99. See Schieffelin, 850 F. Supp. at 236–42 (reporting bench trial was held in September 1993). 
100. Beebe, supra note 97, at 1595 n.65. 
101. Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 25 F. Supp. 3d 865, 870–71, rev’d, No. 14-1568, 2015 
WL 2372675 (4th Cir. May 19, 2015). 
102. See infra notes 128–144 and accompanying text. 
103. I omitted a few trademark cases Dogan and Lemley cite where a defendant lost, but the 
parody argument was not raised. Toho Co. v. William Morrow & Co., for example, concerned the 
use of the GODZILLA mark on an “unauthorized” book about Godzilla, which was not intended to 
parody or otherwise transform the mark; this was an expressive and nominative use, but not a 
parody. 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Similarly, in Parks v. LaFace Records, where Rosa 
Parks complained about the use of her name as the title of an OutKast song, the musicians explicitly 
disavowed any parody of Parks or even any attempt to comment upon her. See 329 F.3d 437, 452, 
456 (6th Cir. 2003); McGeveran, Reform Act, supra note 84, at 2313–14 (discussing effect of these 
disavowals in the case). 
104. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 1987); Hard Rock Cafe 
Licensing Corp. v. Pac. Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1454, 1462 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Grey v. 
Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166, 1175, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d, 830 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 
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cases are from 1994, the same year as Campbell, and one of these deals 
only with New York State dilution law and does not cite the Supreme 
Court case.105 That leaves five parody losses in the past twenty years, 
only two of which appeared in the twenty-first century.106 Dogan and 
Lemley also note a nonprecedential opinion at the Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board cancelling a parody mark.107 
In fairness, there are some other parody losses they could have cited 
but did not, so these are not definitive numbers.108 But whether the grand 
total over some four decades is twelve examples or twenty, that number 
is a tiny fraction of all parody cases, which in turn represent a tiny 
fraction of all trademark cases. More importantly, as noted in the 
previous paragraph, parody’s loss rate is shrinking noticeably over time. 
Responding directly to my assertions that protection for parody in 
trademark law has improved, Dogan and Lemley note “that’s not 
universally true.”109 Certainly they are correct that courts are not 
“universally” perfect (although I argue that such anomalies have become 
far less common, not extinct). Even if every parody loss were wrongly 
decided, however, that error rate would be a very small percentage of a 
very small number—not a crisis in free speech protection. It certainly 
does not support any generalization that trademark parody fares poorly 
in court. 
1987) (table); Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838, 839–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); 
Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). For the authors’ 
discussion of the “Enjoy Cocaine” dispute in Gemini Rising, see Dogan & Lemley, supra note 44, at 
477, 482–83. 
105. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 771 (8th Cir. 1994) (ruling against 
“Michelob Oily” parody of MICHELOB beer ads); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 
40–41 (2d Cir. 1994) (ruling against parodic comparative advertisement under New York 
antidilution law). 
106. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2009) (partially 
ruling against use of “Charbucks” mark for coffee as diluting STARBUCKS); Elvis Presley Enters., 
Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding kitschy “Velvet Elvis” bar infringed on 
trademarks of Elvis Presley estate); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 
1394, 1406 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding book imitating “THE CAT IN THE HAT” was a satire but not a 
parody); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. VIP Prods., LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981–86 (E.D. Mo. 2008) 
(finding “Buttwiper” beach towels infringed BUDWEISER mark also licensed for beach towels); 
Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 728 (D. Minn. 1998) 
(enjoining release of movie entitled “Dairy Queens” as creating likelihood of confusion with 
DAIRY QUEEN mark). 
107. See PRL USA Holdings, Inc. v. Thread Pit, Inc., Cancelation No. 92047436, at 16–17 
(T.T.A.B. May 14, 2012), available at http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/ttabvue-92047436-CAN-
71.pdf. The TTAB canceled a logo for clothing depicting a polo player falling off a horse because of 
its similarity to the familiar Ralph Lauren POLO mark.  
108. See, e.g., Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, 850 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
109. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 44, at 487 n.62. 
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Scholars do a better job than many more practice-oriented sources, 
which routinely recycle the same outdated parody losses without 
acknowledging the changing trends in the case law. They tend to refer 
constantly to the same pre-Campbell losses over and over: the 
underground “Air Pirates” comic mocking Disney, a pornographic 
movie with thinly-veiled imitations of the Dallas Cowboys cheerleaders, 
or that ubiquitous “Enjoy Cocaine” poster.110 The most influential 
trademark treatise dedicates an entire section to “[e]xamples of 
infringing parodies” which cites twenty cases—but every single one of 
them predates Campbell.111 Lack of timely revision has left this treatise 
giving a very inaccurate impression of the parody landscape. In a similar 
way, two different analyses by practitioners of a comedian’s pop-up 
store selling “Dumb Starbucks” products confidently concluded that 
such a parody was infringing; both relied heavily on 1960s and 1970s 
losses like “Enjoy Cocaine” and cited few recent cases.112 They may not 
be wrong in their conclusion about Dumb Starbucks, though I think they 
are; it is at least a close case and certainly requires analysis of more 
recent precedent. 
There is no free speech crisis in judicial rulings on parody cases. As 
we will see in Part III, there is another crisis of much more significance. 
The next Section demonstrates that, even when there are losses, they 
may be justified—and in any case there is no discernible pattern that can 
be connected to any particular source of error. 
B. There Is No Consistent Reason for the Losses 
Not only is the number of losses small, the reasons for those losses 
vary greatly. First, sometimes trademark parody arguments raised by 
direct competitors may deserve to lose. Recall that these cases are 
difficult precisely because of the “cream-skimming” danger of 
110. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978); Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini 
Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
111. See 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 31:154. Nearby sections of the treatise do cite some more 
recent parody case law, but they still do not reflect the overwhelming pro-parody thrust of recent 
decisions. See, e.g., id. at § 31:153. 
112. See Brooke Erdos Singer & Joy J. Wildes, Dumb Starbucks: Grande Parody Or Trademark 
Infringement?, LAW360 (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/516265/dumb-starbucks-
grande-parody-or-trademark-infringement (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. 
Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)); Rothwell, Figg, Ernst & Manbeck, P.C., Dumb Starbucks and 
Parody in Trademark Cases (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.rothwellfigg.com/news_030314.php 
(same). 
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unjustified resort to a parody claim.113 Consider Harley Davidson v. 
Grottanelli,114 a suit against a motorcycle repair business that advertised 
its services with altered and hand-drawn versions of the HARLEY-
DAVIDSON logo.115 Harley-Davidson emphasized that the defendant 
competed with the company’s own repair services. The defendant 
claimed the logo was a parody, but the court concluded that there was no 
real comment on the markholder (or anything else).116 Perhaps the 
defendant should have raised sensible arguments for nominative use or 
other defensive doctrines.117 Parody was a poor fit with these facts. To 
the extent that the defendant was a direct competitor using a similar logo 
that really could divert the goodwill of the markholder, infringement 
liability may have been justified, as in the “Popsi” example. 
Similarly, a district court ruled against a vendor of a “Buttwiper” dog 
toy that mimicked the iconic logo and trade dress of the BUDWEISER 
beer label.118 It isn’t clear just what comment the kindergarten-level joke 
was making, and whether it was directed toward Budweiser at all.119 The 
court relied in part on these more dubious grounds for its decision, but 
focused more on the fact that Budweiser also sold dog-related products 
of its own.120 The court (not incidentally, one sitting in the giant brewing 
113. See supra notes 27–38 and accompanying text. 
114. 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999). 
115. See id. 
116. Id. at 812–13. 
117. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1180–82 (9th Cir. 
2010) (nominative fair use analysis); Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 486 
(5th Cir. 2004) (developing distinct method for handling likelihood of confusion in cases involving 
sales or repair services); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 352, 
supplemented by 413 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1969) (finding no infringement by Volkswagen repairer 
who used term “independent” in conjunction with VOLKSWAGEN marks). 
118. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. VIP Prods., LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Mo. 2008). 
119. Id. at 980 (“The idea for ‘Buttwiper’ came from a Stanley Steamer commercial in which a 
dog scoots across the floor while rubbing its bottom on the carpet. The reaction of the mother to the 
dog’s actions suggests that the carpet will now need to be cleaned.”). The court distinguished the 
“Chewy Vuiton” and “Tommy Holedigger” cases on this ground. Id. at 984–86; see also Keller & 
Tushnet, supra note 44, at 1000–03 (critiquing such parody/satire distinctions). 
120. Anheuser-Busch, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 978 (“Plaintiff has received $147,500 in sales of dog 
items from 1980 to date. Plaintiff does not sell or license any type of dog squeeze toy.”). Of course, 
this conclusion depends on the characterization of the relevant market, often a hotly contested 
aspect of trademark litigation. While there were not licensed Budweiser dog squeeze toys, however, 
there were Budweiser-branded dog beds, food bowls, leashes, collars, and pet mats, so the argument 
was strong that the defendant was operating in the same market. Cf. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. 
Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 258 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Although better known for its 
handbags and luggage, LVM [the LOUIS VUITTON markholder] also markets a limited selection 
of luxury pet accessories—collars, leashes, and dog carriers—which bear the Monogram Canvas 
mark and the Multicolor design. These items range in price from approximately $200 to $1600. 
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company’s hometown of St. Louis) held that the parody might divert 
customers and issued an injunction against it. At least four of the other 
losing alleged parodists noted above also competed in the same market 
as the markholder.121 Certainly this fact alone should not disqualify a 
parody from protection, especially where the joke is so obvious that it is 
difficult to imagine confused purchasers. But the proximity of markets 
may explain why these courts were more guarded in their analysis of the 
parody argument and suspicious that it was really a cloak for more 
traditionally infringing activity. 
There are several other overlapping possible explanations for some 
portion of the parody losses. Four of the losses occurred in the Eighth 
Circuit, where older decisions unsympathetic to parody may continue to 
hold sway.122 Sometimes judges decide that parodists took “too 
much”123 or they interpret language about parody and satire in Campbell 
too inflexibly124 and find that the markholder was not the butt of the 
joke.125 Dogan and Lemley point to three other factors: courts depend on 
LVM does not make dog toys.”). 
121. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009) (brand name 
of coffee); Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999) (logo for motorcycle 
repair services); Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994) (advertisement for 
lawn tractors); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Pac. Graphics, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. 
Wash. 1991) (design transfers for clothing); see also PRL USA Holdings, Inc. v. Thread Pit, Inc., 
Cancelation No. 92047436 (T.T.A.B. May 14, 2012) (nonprecedential), available at 
http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/ttabvue-92047436-CAN-71.pdf (logo on clothing). 
122. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994); Mut. of Omaha Ins. 
Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. VIP Prods., LLC, 666 F. Supp. 
2d 974, 986 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (distinguishing more recent cases from other circuits and instead 
relying on the older Eighth Circuit cases as “more on point”); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line 
Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 734 (D. Minn. 1998) (dedicating two paragraphs to explaining the 
1994 and 1987 Eighth Circuit cases and stating that “the Eighth Circuit, after carefully balancing the 
conflicting interests, has allowed injunctive relief—even when the enjoined material included some 
expressive content”).  
123. See Balducci, 28 F.3d at 774 (criticizing defendant’s “painstaking duplication of Anheuser–
Busch’s marks”); Am. Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 730–31 (noting the one letter difference 
between DAIRY QUEEN and “Dairy Queens” and the near identical sound in speech, supported by 
the court’s memories of “taking its children for ‘Dairy Queens’ on a warm summer’s evening”). 
124. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text. 
125. In PRL USA Holdings, Inc. v. Thread Pit, Inc., No. 92047436 (T.T.A.B. May 14, 2012), 
available at http://ttabvue.uspto.gov/ttabvue/ttabvue-92047436-CAN-71.pdf, for example, the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board found that the obvious ridicule of the POLO mark still was not 
parody, partly based on the registrant’s concession that “the intent of the design of Registrant’s 
mark was to parody the elite in society as embodied by the sport of polo” and not solely the Ralph 
Lauren brand. Id. at *14–16; see also Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 200 (5th 
Cir. 1998) (“The Defendants’ parody of the faddish bars of the sixties does not require the use of 
EPE’s marks because it does not target Elvis Presley; therefore, the necessity to use the marks 
significantly decreases and does not justify the use.”); Am. Dairy Queen, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 734 
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poor confusion evidence, an inadequate articulation of dilution harms, or 
an unexamined aversion to free riding.126 Simon analyzed a handful of 
parody losses and concluded that those courts simply paid too little 
attention to the parody elements of the defendant’s use.127 
And sometimes, courts just blow it. Fortunately, appeals can undo 
judicial blunders—and they are a more reliable route to error correction 
than tinkering with the underlying rules. The most recent parody loss, 
Radiance Foundation v. NAACP,128 was just reversed by the Fourth 
Circuit in May 2015.129 The lower court’s decision was indefensible. It 
involved Ryan Bomberger, an African-American conservative activist, 
and the Radiance Foundation, an organization he founded to advance his 
views.130 Radiance is critical of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People—better known as the NAACP—for 
what Bomberger views as the NAACP’s support of abortion. Radiance 
and another conservative organization posted articles on three web sites 
with text and sometimes headlines referring to the NAACP as the 
“National Association for the Abortion of Colored People.”131 Changing 
one word of the organization’s name, inverting its stance of support for 
the African-American community and replacing it with a position 
antithetical to that community’s interest, is a caustic and pointed 
instance of political parody. Some might view it as offensive or 
inaccurate or tasteless, but of course Campbell teaches us that such 
reactions are irrelevant when parody communicates ideas,132 as 
Bomberger certainly did. 
The district court held a bench trial and produced an opinion that 
found Radiance liable under both infringement and dilution theories.133 
It cited Campbell only once, indirectly, embedded in another citation 
unrelated to the social value of parody.134 The court also ignored several 
(finding movie title referred to DAIRY QUEEN mark but did not comment upon Dairy Queen 
restaurants). 
126. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 44, at 481–84. 
127. See Simon, supra note 26, at 1063–65. 
128. 25 F. Supp. 3d 865, 870–71 (E.D. Va. 2014), rev’d, No. 14–1568, 2015 WL 2372675 (4th 
Cir. May 19, 2015). 
129. Radiance, 2015 WL 2372675. 
130. Radiance, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 870–71. 
131. Id. at 871. 
132. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
133. Radiance, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 870–71. 
134. Id. at 891 (citing Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 
1567 n.6 (S.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (referencing Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994))). 
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other recent landmarks in the doctrine of trademarks and speech, such as 
Rogers v. Grimaldi and Mattel v. MCA Records,135 although the 
defendants’ key submission to the court likewise did not cite these or 
other important out-of-circuit cases.136 The Radiance decision 
disregarded parody in almost all of its likelihood of confusion analysis, 
noting it only when considering intent, and there concluding—
astonishingly—that Bomberger intended to confuse people into thinking 
that his parodic moniker really was the NAACP’s name.137 The dilution 
analysis was even worse, finding Radiance’s parody was ineligible for 
three clearly applicable categorical exclusions from dilution liability in 
the Lanham Act.138 No amount of refining the rules can improve a 
decision when a judge’s intuition leads to a particular result. 
The Radiance district court opinion stands out among contemporary 
cases for its atypical failure to consider parody or speech interests 
seriously. The Fourth Circuit repudiated it forcefully.139 The appeals 
court referred to the importance of parody and expression throughout its 
decision (though without citing Campbell directly) and relied on a range 
of cases, particularly Rogers v. Grimaldi, to conclude that any confusion 
among those who visited Bomberger’s website was not the relevant type 
of confusion for trademark law.140 As the court put it: 
[C]onfusion about what a particular trademark says or looks like 
is not relevant for infringement claims. We may certainly 
account for similarities between the trademark holder’s and 
infringer’s marks in the likelihood of confusion analysis, but 
only in the context of how those similarities create confusion 
about the source of any products the marks identify. Likewise, 
trademark infringement is not designed to protect mark holders 
from consumer confusion about their positions on political or 
135. The court cited its own circuit’s speech-protective opinion in Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 
F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005), solely to define services, not to draw on any of its discussion about 
judging likelihood of confusion when websites express critical political views. Id. at 315. 
136. See Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants the Radiance Foundation, Inc. & Ryan Bomberger’s 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Radiance, 25 F. Supp. 3d 865 (No. 2:13CV53), 
2013 WL 8811317, ECF No. 67. 
137. Radiance, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 887–88. The court dismissively brushed aside Radiance’s 
parody arguments, saying the mockery of the NAACP marks “lack[ed] many of the classic elements 
of a successful parody.” Id. at 892. 
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012). 
139. See generally Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, No. 14-1568, 2015 WL 2372675 (4th Cir. 
May 19, 2015). 
140. See generally Lemley & McKenna, supra note 9 (distinguishing between types of confusion 
(relevant v. irrelevant)); McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 69. 
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social issues.141 
The Fourth Circuit also concluded, contrary to the district court, that 
Bomberger’s web postings clearly fell within safe harbors from dilution 
liability under the Lanham Act.142 
Appellate courts have advantages over trial courts in reaching legally 
correct decisions, including a slower pace, panel deliberation, and more 
refined briefing.143 In Radiance, furthermore, the Fourth Circuit 
benefited from a well-done amicus brief highlighting speech issues and 
pointing to a range of case law from around the country, particularly the 
Rogers and Mattel decisions.144 Thus, in the rare case of an erroneous 
parody loss in the trial court, appeals offer another opportunity to rectify 
the mistake and further reduce the risk of error costs. 
If we could identify one single fatal flaw in parody adjudication that 
caused errors, it might be worth altering doctrine to address that flaw. In 
fact, the multifarious reasons for the rejection of parody arguments 
prevent any singular focused response. Multiple adjustments in 
inherently complex parody doctrine to reduce error would be extremely 
difficult. Appeals would be a surer recourse. Finally, even if the rules 
were perfected, the error rate will never be zero because parodists’ 
lawyers don’t always do a good job and judges are human. 
And that’s okay. The previous Section demonstrated that adjudicated 
trademark parody cases are rare. Out of this small number, an even 
smaller number are losses. Out of the few losses, even fewer are wrongly 
decided. All these trends have grown more favorable for parodists over 
time. The tiny remaining error costs are background noise—outlier 
mistakes, inevitable in any adversarial adjudication system, which are 
not worth trying to fix directly. In other words: stop worrying about 
getting trademark parody cases right. The courts already do. 
141. Radiance, 2015 WL 2372675, at *8–9 (emphasis added). 
142. The Fourth Circuit, quite correctly, reversed the district court and found that Bomberger’s 
parody was covered by two separate statutory exclusions, one for fair use and one for 
noncommercial use. Id. at *12–13. Although the Fourth Circuit did not reach the issue, the 
opinionated news item certainly qualifies in addition for a third exclusion immunizing “news 
commentary.” See BidZirk, LLC v. Smith, No. CIV.A. 6:06-109-HMH, 2007 WL 3119445, at *6–7 
(D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2007). 
143. See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231–32 (1991) (“Courts of appeals . . . are 
structurally suited to the collaborative juridical process that promotes decisional accuracy.”).  
144. See, e.g., Brief of the Electronic Frontier Foundation & the ACLU of Virginia as Amici in 
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Radiance, 2015 WL 2372675 (No. 14-1568).  
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III. MARKHOLDERS GETTING IT WRONG 
The previous Part showed that error costs are not a serious problem 
with trademark parody doctrine. As this Part explains, commentators 
who persist in suggesting otherwise actually aggravate the true problem: 
administrative costs.145 Moreover, their misguided focus distracts law 
reform efforts from the real problem. 
In 2014, Google acquired Nest Labs, a Silicon Valley startup that 
makes “smart” thermostats, internet-connected devices which “learn” 
your behavior and preferences and adjust the heat in your home 
according to those patterns.146 Unsurprisingly, some observers worried 
that the merger would allow Google, already in possession of vast stores 
of personal data, to gather individualized and detailed information about 
activities inside customers’ homes.147 A German activist group 
responded with a humorous website at the URL google-nest.org, 
purporting to launch other invasive Google products such as “Google 
Bee (offering personal drones), Google Hug (location-based 
crowdsourced hug-matching), and Google Bye (online profiles for the 
afterlife).”148 Google responded to the spoof with a cease-and-desist 
letter demanding that the parodists take down the site and transfer the 
domain name to Google.149 Even though the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation agreed to represent the parodists for free, they chose to take 
the site down. 
This was not an isolated incident. Companies send cease-and-desist 
145. Error costs are the costs exacted by decisions that do not reach the “correct” result based on 
an accurate analysis of the applicable standard; administrative costs (also sometimes called “legal 
process costs”) are the costs of the procedures used in that application. In general, more procedure 
and more precise rules reduce risk of error but increase administrative costs. See McGeveran, 
Reform Act, supra note 84, at 2279–86 (discussing the imbalance between error costs and 
administrative costs in current trademark “fair use” doctrine). 
146. See Yoky Matsuoka, Teaching Nest to Save Energy, NEST LABS (Nov. 8, 2011), 
https://nest.com/blog/2011/11/08/teaching-nest-to-save-energy/.  
147. See, e.g., Mike Schuster, Google’s Nest Buyout Raises Privacy Concerns, USA TODAY (Jan. 
16, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/01/16/google-acquires-nest-privacy/4518317/; 
Rakesh Sharma, Google’s Acquisition of Nest And Your Privacy, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rakeshsharma/2014/01/13/googles-acquisition-of-nest-and-your-
privacy/. In fact, at least for now, Nest remains largely distinct from Google and its current privacy 
policy does not allow it to share data with Google. See Frequently Asked Questions About Privacy, 
NEST, https://nest.com/privacy-faq/ (last visited May 24, 2015); Privacy Statement, NEST, 
https://nest.com/legal/privacy-statement/ (last visited May 24, 2015). 
148. Schuster, supra note 147. 
149. See Corynne McSherry, Dear Google: Parody Is Not Trademark Infringement, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (May 20, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/05/dear-google-parody-not-
trademark-infringement. 
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letters objecting to parodies of their brands with some regularity. For 
example, Nestlé, owner of the POLAND SPRING trademark, objected 
to a conceptual art piece that featured Poland Spring water bottles with 
rubber bracelets inserted inside them on sale for 300 dollars.150 Marlboro 
complained about a t-shirt that copied the design of its cigarette pack but 
replaced the brand name with the word “Death” and depicted its bold red 
lines dripping with blood.151 The managers of the METRO transit 
system in Washington, D.C. sent a cease-and-desist letter to a parodist 
behind a purported dating website for people stuck on overheated 
subway cars (“Our broken escalator system and failing AC ensures a 
sweaty encounter with your match, no matter what time of day or 
night!”).152 
None of these disputes resulted in litigation. All of them received 
media coverage, however, so the recipients of these demands fought 
back at least somewhat by making a fuss in the press. In some instances, 
parodists removed or altered their imitation of the mark, while in a few, 
they resisted and the markholder backed off. Unlike these, most 
trademark demand letters never become public.153 By every available 
indication, the vast majority of demand letters result in quick 
capitulation.154 
Trademark scholars have begun to document more fully the 
phenomenon of shadow enforcement of trademark rights, occurring prior 
150. See Christine Chu, Artist Slapped with Trademark Infringement Claim by Nestlé, ARTNET 
(Jan. 13, 2015), http://news.artnet.com/in-brief/artist-slapped-with-trademark-infringement-claim-
by-nestle-219595. 
151. See Joe Mullin, Philip Morris Attacks Marlboro Parody, Runs into ‘Web Bully’s Worst 
Enemy,’ ARSTECHNICA (June 17, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/philip-morris-
attacks-marlboro-parody-runs-into-web-bullys-worst-enemy/. 
152. See Will Sommer, Metro Sends Cease-and-Desist to Parody ‘HotCars’ Site, WASH. CITY 
PAPER (May 30, 2013), http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/citydesk/2013/05/30/metro-
sends-cease-and-desist-to-parody-hotcars-site/. The parodist “redacted” the trademarks with 
imitation black marker and kept the site up. See HotCars Is Here to Turn Up the Heat on Your Love 
Life, HOTCARS, http://metrohotcars.com/ (last visited June 1, 2015).  
153. For one effort to collect, analyze, and publicize takedown requests sent to online 
intermediaries by IP owners seeking to remove allegedly infringing online content, see CHILLING 
EFFECTS, https://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited June 1, 2015). Google sends copies of many 
of the takedown requests it receives to Chilling Effects, but this represents only a subset of all IP-
based demand letters; for one thing, it only includes requests sent to intermediaries, not those sent 
directly to alleged infringers. See Legal Removal Requests, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/ 
legal/answer/3110420 (last visited June 1, 2015). 
154. See generally William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow 
of IP Law, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 453 (2012); Kenneth L. Port, 
Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585 (2008).  
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to any lawsuit.155 Very aggressive pre-suit claims may rise to the level of 
“trademark bullying.”156 When they fall short of bullying, cease-and-
desist letters that stem from zealous advocacy or good-faith efforts to 
police trademark rights still can be excessive if they assert stronger 
protection than the law actually provides.157 Plus, cease-and-desist letters 
are not the only example of informal activity that discourages trademark 
parodies in the shadow of the law. Large gatekeeping institutions such as 
movie studios and publishers, websites that host content, or insurers 
often take very conservative positions about rights clearance.158 Even the 
federal agency charged with enforcing trademark law’s importation 
provisions can have a tenuous grasp on the boundaries between 
infringement and parody.159 
Administrative costs of existing trademark doctrine, particularly the 
fact-intensive likelihood of confusion analysis, make it difficult to 
resolve disputes involving trademark parodies quickly and cheaply.160 
Meanwhile, the desire to parody a mark will rarely be as strong as the 
markholder’s stake in protecting its rights.161 Not only are the marks 
connected to valuable brands, but markholders interviewed by Jessica 
Silbey referred to those brands as their “babies” or as “priceless assets,” 
further explaining their very strong motivation to control them.162 Add 
these asymmetric incentives to the administrative costs discussed above 
and it would be rational for parodists to accede to markholder 
demands—or never to use a mark in the first place—even if they had 
155. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 154; Leah C. Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 
WIS. L. REV. 625 (2011) [hereafter Grinvald, Shaming]; Leah C. Grinvald, Policing the Cease-and-
Desist Letter, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) [hereafter Grinvald, Policing]; Irina D. Manta, 
Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853 (2012); 
see also McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 6, at 63–66. 
156. See Grinvald, Shaming, supra note 155, at 641–50 (defining “trademark bullying”). 
157. See Gallagher, supra note 154, at 488–92 (finding that IP lawyers knowingly make “weak” 
claims in demand letters and justify doing so on several grounds). One attorney interviewed by 
Gallagher explained why he asserted a copyright claim in a demand letter more strongly than he 
believed warranted: “[The claim] was weak, but you never know. It’s not going to be decided by a 
judge quickly.” Id. at 489. 
158. See McGeveran, Rethinking, supra note 6, at 63. 
159. Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Overreach of the Day: ICE Says “Yankees Suck” Infringes, 
REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43 (B)LOG (Jan. 31, 2015, 9:53 AM), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2015/01/ 
trademark-overreach-of-day-ice-says.html; see also Nestor Ramos, US Agents Tackle Fake Super 
Bowl Items, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 31, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/01/31/searching-for-
tom-bardy-feds-hunt-counterfeiters-before-big-game/SusU4CTQW5nfEC0wvLvkIM/story.html. 
160. See McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 69. 
161. See McGeveran, Reform Act, supra note 84, at 2276–78. 
162. JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 156–62 (2015). 
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100% certainty that the law would vindicate them in the end.163 
Resource imbalance alone can have more influence on outcomes than 
legal merits. Some markholders rely on these imbalances to make 
trademark threats of questionable legal worth. When William Gallagher 
conducted an empirical interview-based investigation of IP enforcement 
practices, one trademark attorney readily told him so when recounting a 
war story: “The lawyer on the other side was yelling at me about [how] 
we didn’t have a case, and I said you must be confusing me with 
somebody who cares about the merits. We are the giant in this case and 
we’ve decided we’re not going to tolerate this, we’re not going to give 
up.”164 
Of course, markholders also choose to ignore parodies sometimes. 
PepsiCo made no trademark argument against a viral parody DORITOS 
ad by an environmental group,165 opting instead to issue a statement 
contesting the merits of the group’s claims about palm oil and 
deforestation.166 Another lawyer interviewed by Gallagher explained 
what he says to clients who want to enforce trademark rights against a 
parody: “You’re not going to win, and it’s a lot of publicity sometimes, 
makes the newspapers. Ignore them and they will just go away. If you 
persist, you lose your case and get in F.3d.”167 
There really is no way to determine how frequently markholders send 
cease-and-desist letters and how often they decide to tolerate parody 
instead. Nor is there any measure for how often snarky comics avoid 
mocking marks for fear of liability. What can be said definitively is this: 
demands happen much, much more often than lawsuits.168 
All of this informal settlement activity occurs, as the saying goes, in 
the shadow of the law.169 The existence and strength of legal rights and 
163. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 44, at 488 (“Even if the law could guarantee the right 
result at trial, many parodists are small companies without the will or resources to fight a case all 
the way to trial. Many will cave in and abandon their parodies rather than hire a lawyer.”). 
164. Gallagher, supra note 154, at 486. The interviewee then reported that eventually the 
adversary “gave up.” Id. 
165. It’s a pretty hilarious parody. See SumOfUs, A Cheesy Love Story - The Ad Doritos Don’t 
Want You to See, YOUTUBE (Jan. 11, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VPlxNhEc2lA. 
166. See E.J. Schultz, Parody Ad: Doritos Addiction Leads to Rain-Forest Destruction, 
ADVERTISING AGE (Jan. 15, 2015), http://adage.com/article/see-the-spot/parody-doritos-ad-targets-
pepsico-s-palm-oil-policies/296626. 
167. Gallagher, supra note 154, at 473. 
168. See id. at 481–85 (describing the art of “demand letter lawyering” in IP cases); Grinvald, 
Policing, supra note 155 (describing how often trademark attorneys use cease-and-desist letters). 
169. See generally Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model 
of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982). 
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remedies profoundly influence the relative leverage of parties as they 
seek to resolve disputes without judicial intervention. Certainly, other 
considerations such as legal costs and risk tolerance also influence 
parties’ approach to settlement in a dispute of any kind, from trademarks 
to trespass.170 Those factors can be especially significant in parody 
situations because many parodists will be less sanguine about both costs 
and risk than many markholders.171 Attorneys also bring their own 
experiences and biases to their prediction of likely outcomes, and 
therefore to their assessments of pre-litigation maneuvering.172 
Nevertheless, appraisals of a case’s probable strength are crucial. This 
may be even more so in trademark parody suits, which ordinarily will 
seek preliminary injunctive relief,173 making that very prediction about 
likelihood of success a linchpin of the applicable legal standard.174 
In parody disputes, the ability to assess likely outcomes often will be 
unequal between markholders represented by experienced trademark 
counsel and parodists who may be unrepresented or advised by lawyers 
who do not specialize in trademark law.175 It is possible for generalist 
lawyers to go through all the trademark parody cases, count them up, 
and reach the same conclusion I did in Part II. In the real world, 
however, they aren’t going to undertake that type of detailed legal 
research in an unfamiliar area lightly. They are more likely to peruse 
secondary sources for a quick take on the chances of defending the 
parody. When they do, they will find repeated characterizations of 
trademark parody as a problem that needs solving, or of judges 
frequently ruling against parodists in trademark cases. 
As scholars, we should not contribute to a narrative that is both 
inaccurate and damaging. When commentators regularly reinforce the 
false impression that courts are tough on trademark parody, parodists 
and their attorneys may be forgiven for believing them. Markholders 
170. See PRENTISS COX & LAURA THOMAS, LAW IN PRACTICE 80–87 (2013). 
171. See McGeveran, Reform Act, supra note 84, at 2276–78.  
172. See Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case 
Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133 (2010). 
173. J. Thomas McCarthy, Are Preliminary Injunctions Against Trademark Infringement Getting 
Harder to Achieve?, 14 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 4 (2009) (arguing that despite recent Supreme 
Court rulings making it more difficult to receive injunctions, trademark cases are distinguishable 
and plaintiffs will continue to be entitled to preliminary injunctions). 
174. See Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 145–46 (2d Cir. 2003) (reversing district 
court’s denial of preliminary injunction because nearly all of the likelihood of confusion factors 
weighed in favor of the plaintiff and plaintiff thus showed a likelihood of success on the merits).  
175. For a helpful general discussion of cases involving such asymmetry, see Robert G. Bone, 
Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 542–50 (1997). 
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may rely on commentators’ repeated invocation of dated cases and 
rhetoric to support claims that their trademark rights are broader than the 
courts actually recognize. Distorting the actual treatment of parody in 
the law emboldens markholders to enforce their marks against parodies 
and discourages parodists from resisting those efforts. In the end, this 
exacerbates the true problem by making pre-litigation demands against 
legitimate trademark parodies even more effective. 
Not only do inaccurate portrayals of parody outcomes perpetuate 
misinformation, they can also distract reform efforts. The types of 
responses that would address the real problems of demand letters and 
administrative costs are not the same ones that would increase accuracy 
of results. “Fast lanes” for unlicensed uses of trademarks with significant 
social utility address the real problem.176 To preserve the speech value of 
parody,177 defensive doctrines that allow legitimate parodists to quickly 
escape from liability—whether constructed as an affirmative defense, a 
presumption, or some other civil procedure mechanism—would be the 
most beneficial. They might not increase accuracy, and they could even 
decrease it slightly, but they would help parodists faced with a demand 
letter. A response to the markholder’s threats will be stronger when “a 
defendant can cite a simple rule and assert that it decimates the 
plaintiff’s claim.”178 In addition, reducing the threat of costly and 
burdensome litigation significantly reduces the in terrorem effect of 
cease-and-desist letters. 
Unfortunately, attributes of parody cases can make it difficult to tailor 
special fast-lane doctrines for them. First, as discussed above, the 
threshold identification of a “parodic character” is challenging.179 Even 
if that difficulty can be overcome, Campbell shows us that the inherent 
complexity of parody cases and the danger of cream-skimming requires 
a fine-grained and fact-intensive analysis.180 Reducing risk of error in 
this analysis inevitably will increase administrative costs, not reduce 
176. See generally William McGeveran, Life in the Fast Lane: Of Presumptions, Defenses, and 
Burdens, 1 IP THEORY 25 (2010) [hereinafter McGeveran, Fast Lane], available at 
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ipt/vol1/iss1/2. 
177. See supra Part I.A. 
178. McGeveran, Reform Act, supra note 84, at 2279. 
179. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 44; McGeveran, Fast Lane, supra note 176, at 26 (“[T]he 
definition of eligibility for the fast lane must be quite clear . . . . Without such simplicity, the 
efficiency of a fast lane is lost in determining who belongs there.”); supra notes 39–43 and 
accompanying text. 
180. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994) (“The fact that parody can 
claim legitimacy for some appropriation does not, of course, tell either parodist or judge much about 
where to draw the line.”). 
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them. This will further discourage trademark parody defendants from 
standing their ground because it will inflate the expense of litigation. It 
will also make responses to cease-and-desist letters less confident, not 
more so. The next Part discusses some broader reform approaches that 
would protect most parodies with minimal litigation cost. Rather than 
striving to achieve perfect accuracy, parody doctrine is best served by a 
range of approaches designed to improve efficiency. Furthermore, 
because of the special difficulties involved in parody cases, defensive 
doctrines will be more efficient if they cover a broader array of 
expressive and other socially valuable uses that include parody. 
IV. RESPONSES TO THE REAL TRADEMARK PARODY CRISIS 
This final Part considers changes in the doctrine of trademark parody 
that might address the real problems identified above—those arising 
from threats of litigation rather than actual lawsuits. 
To do so, let us begin once more with Campbell. At the outset, 
remember that Campbell itself did not craft any new copyright rules, or 
carve out any special treatment of parody as a unique category of its 
own. The Court merely reaffirmed the value of parody and then provided 
guidance for applying the existing fair use test under Section 107.181 In 
the same way, trademark law can address parody with existing tools 
rather than inventing something special for parody alone. Second, recall 
that the social value of parody derives from its speech content.182 Parody 
is a form of commentary that allows salient observations about the 
powerful branding symbolism anchored in trademarks. If markholders 
can prevent such critique, then they can abuse the power of their limited 
legal monopoly to stymie expression of alternative views.183 It is this 
societal value of parody that must be preserved. Finally, consider again 
the differences in animating purposes of copyright and trademark law 
and how they play out in Campbell. Parody is simultaneously a greater 
threat to copyright’s purposes than to trademark’s purposes, and also a 
bigger vindication of those purposes in copyright than in trademark.184 
I have warned before that we should not strive for a single perfect test 
181. See id. at 578–93; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
182. See supra Part I.A. 
183. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he trademark 
owner does not have the right to control public discourse whenever the public imbues his mark with 
a meaning beyond its source-identifying function.”); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 
F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1987) (“Trademark rights do not entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized use 
of the mark by another who is communicating ideas or expressing points of view.”). 
184. See supra notes 67–77 and accompanying text. 
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to identify and protect uses of trademarks that serve speech interests.185 
Instead, I have advocated for these types of expressive uses to 
move through a sequence of successively more complicated 
tests. One can picture these tests as a series of nets inserted in a 
stream—the first and most porous might catch only the largest 
fish, the second might have narrower holes to capture smaller 
ones, and then the third would stop even tiny minnows.186 
This same recommendation applies even more strongly to the 
narrower example of parody within the broader realm of expressive uses. 
A single one-size-fits-all parody defense is not possible or desirable. A 
series of increasingly rigorous tests will catch successively more 
legitimate parodies, but require successively more effort and 
administrative costs.187 
The first net should apply exemptions to certain types of materials. In 
the past I have proposed a safe harbor for trademarks appearing within 
communicative works such as books, films, newspapers, magazines, 
websites, musical compositions, and video games.188 Likelihood of 
consumer confusion in this situation is very low; any confusion that does 
occur would be an amorphous association with the mark rather than the 
direct risk of passing off that lies at the core of trademark law.189 
Avoiding this type of attenuated confusion should not be the primary 
aim of trademark law.190 The risks of “cream-skimming” are remote—
185. See, e.g., McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 69. 
186. McGeveran, Reform Act, supra note 84, at 2299. 
187. Copyright law, for example, relies on multiple tests of differing specificity to determine 
whether a work may be protected from infringement liability that might otherwise apply. Many 
provisions of the Copyright Act protect narrowly defined uses of a copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 108–122 (2012) (granting defenses for certain works in noncommercial broadcasting, allowing 
reproduction of works for blind or other people with disabilities, and more). To take one example, 
Section 108 authorizes libraries to make one copy of a phonorecord where the reproduction is done 
without commercial advantage, the library is open to the public, and the reproduction includes a 
notice of the copyright. Id. § 108(a). If none of these specific exceptions applies, there may still be a 
fair use defense, of course. See id. § 107; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
Contract defenses operate in the same manner. For example, a defendant may escape liability under 
the statute of frauds. See, e.g., Dynegy, Inc. v. Yates, 422 S.W.3d 638, 643 (Tex. 2013), reh’g 
denied (Mar. 21, 2014). In cases where the statute of frauds does not apply, a defendant may assert 
other broader defenses, including more fact-intensive equitable ones such as unconscionability. See, 
e.g., Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010). 
188. See McGeveran, Reform Act, supra note 84, at 2307–12. 
189. See McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 69; Lemley & McKenna, supra note 9. 
190. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 9, at 448; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark 
Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 408 (1999); McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 69, at 255; 
Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1317–18 (2011). 
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that is to say, the worst that could happen is that consumers believe 
Pepsi somehow approves of a movie in which a character drinks it, not 
that they mistakenly bought Popsi when they meant to buy Pepsi. 
The sorting needed to determine eligibility for this safe harbor would 
be relatively straightforward. A court would ask whether the work fit 
within a defined category of communicative works. This initial 
determination would be considerably easier than identifying the presence 
of parody at the outset of a case.191 The line would depend on the type of 
work, not the type of humor. As a result, it would impose much lower 
administrative costs on defendants than any parody-specific defensive 
doctrine could. It would also offer an extremely simple and clear 
response to any cease-and-desist threats: If the work is covered by the 
exemption, the markholder has no claim.192 
Many parodies would be protected by a safe harbor for 
communicative works. Most are uses of a mark that ultimately would 
prevail in court anyway after more complex analysis. The photographs 
and song mocking Barbie dolls, the book parodying Cliffs Notes, and the 
pornographic L.L. Bean imitation193—all could have been resolved 
efficiently and early using this broad and highly simplified rationale. 
Blog posts such as the one about the NAACP in the Radiance case 
would be categorically exempt as well.194 Confusion perceived by the 
court in Radiance was not trademark-oriented confusion about the 
source or the affiliation of Bomberger’s articles, but was confusion 
about (it seems) the opinions of the NAACP. If the defendants had 
instead asserted on their blog, “the NAACP wants to promote 
abortions,” then the organization would suffer exactly the same alleged 
injury—an asserted distortion of its views—without any trademark 
claim. Indeed, since this is a political opinion rather than a false 
statement of fact, it is difficult to imagine any other grounds for 
191. See supra notes 39–43, 179, and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of threshold 
determination of “parodic character” in trademark law). 
192. A comparable safe harbor can be found in the law’s immunization of internet intermediaries 
from liability for user-generated content. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012); McGeveran, Fast Lane, supra 
note 176, at 25–26. 
193. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (photographs of 
BARBIE dolls); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (song about 
BARBIE); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 
1989) (book parodying Cliffs Notes study guides); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 
F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (pornographic magazine parodying L.L. BEAN). 
194. See supra 128–144 and accompanying text (discussing Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, 25 
F. Supp. 3d 865 (E.D. Va. 2014)). 
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liability.195 In other words, uses in communicative works are so unlikely 
to cause core trademark injury that they should be set aside. Many 
statements enjoying this categorical immunity will be parodies. 
Even without a full safe harbor like this proposal, several existing 
defensive doctrines encompass parodies. In particular, the standard from 
Rogers v. Grimaldi has become increasingly widespread and robust over 
time.196 As expressed by the Ninth Circuit, the test now says: 
An artistic work’s use of a trademark that otherwise would 
violate the Lanham Act is not actionable unless the use of the 
mark has no artistic relevance to the underlying work 
whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless it 
explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.197 
That court went on to emphasize that the first prong protected uses 
unless they had “no artistic relevance to the underlying work 
whatsoever. . . . In other words, the level of relevance merely must be 
above zero.”198 Likewise, few cases have found any aspect of a use 
“explicitly misleading,” as might occur if the fictional film that evoked 
Ginger Rogers had instead called itself her “True Life Story.”199 This 
reading of Rogers comes close to a categorical exclusion. While it is not 
quite as clean or efficient an analysis as an exemption would be, the 
195. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525, 558 (1977) (requiring proof of falsehood, 
not merely confusion, in defamation claims); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–
80 (1964) (establishing the actual malice standard for defamation concerning matters of public 
concern, which effectively requires a showing equivalent to knowledge of falsity or recklessness 
about falsity); 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 795 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, No. 14-
779, 2015 WL 1280248 (Mar. 23, 2015) (strongly suggesting that a statute prohibiting false 
statements in political campaigns is unconstitutional). 
196. See McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 69, at 289–90; Kerry L. Timbers & Julia Huston, 
The ‘Artistic Relevance Test’ Just Became Relevant: The Increasing Strength of the First 
Amendment as a Defense to Trademark Infringement and Dilution, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1278, 
1291–300 (2003) (noting spread of Rogers artistic relevance test); Daniel Jacob Wright, Explicitly 
Explicit: The Rogers Test and the Ninth Circuit, 21 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 193, 203 (2013) (noting 
adoption of some form of the Rogers test in the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits); 
see also Radiance Found., Inc. v. NAACP, No. 14-1568, 2015 WL 2372675, at *10 (4th Cir. May 
19, 2015) (using Rogers test in recent decision). 
197. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 902; Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d. Cir. 1989)). 
For a more recent district court opinion applying this Rogers/MCA framework capaciously, see Mil-
Spec Monkey, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., No. 14-CV-02361-RS, 2014 WL 6655844, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2014). 
198. Rock Star Videos, 547 F.3d at 1100 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
199. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1000; see also Univ. of Ala. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 
1278–79 (11th Cir. 2012). But see Rebelution, LLC v. Perez, 732 F. Supp. 2d 883, 888 (N.D. Cal. 
2010) (conflating “explicitly misleading” prong of Rogers with broader analysis for likelihood of 
confusion and denying summary judgment on that basis). 
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emerging “more than zero artistic relevance” rule definitely reduces 
administrative costs.200 It can be determined early in a case, and it can be 
used as a response to demand letters. Once again, many parodies can 
benefit from this doctrine. 
Consider, for example, a district court’s 1998 injunction against using 
“Dairy Queens” as the title for a black comedy about a teen beauty 
pageant in a small Minnesota town.201 A court facing these facts today, if 
it applied the Rogers test as articulated by the Ninth Circuit, would rule 
for the defendants easily.202 Furthermore, although this use of the 
DAIRY QUEEN trademark could be seen as satire rather than parody, 
the Rogers framework would allow the court to sidestep this complex 
but irrelevant determination and move efficiently to the core speech-
related interests in the movie title. 
Other existing doctrines besides the artistic relevance test could also 
allow for reasonably efficient resolution. One of the parody losses noted 
above, Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.,203 involved an advertisement 
that ridiculed a rival company’s logo and brand image.204 This case was 
decided under state dilution law the same year as Campbell. In the 
decades since, federal dilution law has incorporated a provision 
inoculating comparative advertising,205 which would fit these facts well 
and might have influenced a judge to read parallel state law more 
strictly.206 By setting aside all comparative advertising in dilution cases, 
the federal statute effectively creates a safe harbor for parody used in 
such advertising. 
Other parodies are not contained within neat identifiable categories 
like communicative works or comparative advertising, but still seem to 
fall outside the traditional purposes of trademark protection. The 
200. Compare, for example, a proposal by Pratheepan Gulasekaram to rely on an older 
understanding of Rogers that would require complex confusion analysis, and potentially would even 
find a case like Dallas Cowboys noninfringing because of similarity between the parody and 
original. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free Speech: 
Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. REV. 887, 928 (2005). 
201. See Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998). 
If you have ever been to the Minnesota State Fair, as this author has many times, you know the 
strong connection between dairy and beauty queens around here. 
202. Instead, the district court repeatedly cited more outmoded Eighth Circuit precedent like the 
“Michelob Oily” and “Mutant of Omaha” cases. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
203. 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994). 
204. Id. 
205. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(1) (2012). 
206. Cf. Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 425 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(interpreting a state dilution statute narrowly to avoid overly broad restrictions on speech). 
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nominative use doctrine,207 while a more involved determination than 
these others, has also been applied to terminate litigation early208 and 
could be another mechanism—one of the later nets—to protect parody 
with relatively low administrative costs compared to full consideration 
of the multifactor test for likelihood of confusion. 
Tougher cases arise when parodies have conventional commercial 
characteristics of their own. Dogan and Lemley differentiate between a 
“traditional” parody that “makes fun of a trademark without adopting it 
as a brand”209 and newer forms of “brand parodies” that “serve as 
brands, logos, or taglines for commercial products.”210 I do not think 
these two groups can be divided from one another as cleanly as the 
authors assume. But their observation raises the important point that 
sometimes parodies, like the “Chewy Vuiton” dog toy, are also engaged 
in directly commercial activity of their own alongside any speech 
character of their parody.211 How can the law handle these? 
Disputes over parodies outside of categories like communicative 
works cannot always be resolved simply. The risk of cream-skimming 
grows somewhat because trademarks used in other settings might be 
more likely to cause Popsi-style core confusion.212 Even here, however, 
the main risk of such passing off arises when the parody is used to 
compete with the original.213 Absent such direct competition, the harm is 
more likely to be the relatively more peripheral injury caused when 
consumers erroneously associate the mark with the parody. In light of 
the strong speech interests at stake, trademark law should not necessarily 
intervene in such situations.214 In these circumstances, as Dogan and 
207. See Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010); New 
Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308–09 (9th Cir. 1992). 
208. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(affirming summary judgment for nominative use defense); New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 302 
(same). 
209. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 44, at 477. Like myself, they point to doctrines such as 
statutory dilution exceptions, nominative use, and the Rogers v. Grimaldi test as responses to these 
forms of parody. See id. at 477–81.  
210. Id. at 484. 
211. Id. 
212. See McGeveran, Reform Act, supra note 84, at 2318 (“[W]hile parody might be the 
quintessential fair use scenario, in situations beyond communicative works it raises complex issues 
that cannot be resolved with a categorical rule.”). 
213. See supra notes 113–121 and accompanying text (discussing instances like Harley Davidson 
v. Grotanelli and the “Buttwiper” case where direct competitors’ parody defenses were not 
successful). 
214. See McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 69, at 275–77 (“[E]ven when consumer confusion 
does cause relevant injury, intervening to prevent it may do more harm than good for the broader 
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Lemley suggest, “given the value of even non-parodic but expressive 
uses, such as satire, small amounts of confusion should not justify an 
injunction.”215 
Even when a parody cannot be adjudicated based on clearly defined 
safe harbors or through doctrines such as artistic relevance or nominative 
use, at least courts can streamline analysis of confusion. As Mark 
McKenna and I recently argued, “confusion isn’t everything” in 
trademark doctrine, notwithstanding the tendency of many courts and 
lawyers to assume it is.216 Trademark law respects communication 
interests inherent in some uses of trademarks, and these certainly include 
parodies. We showed how the inherent flexibility and common-law roots 
of the likelihood of confusion standard allow courts to give different 
treatment to different types of confusion caused in particular scenarios 
like parody.217 
Thus, where other defensive doctrines do not exist or do not apply, 
courts that have discerned a “parodic character” in the defendant’s use 
should demand proof of core passing-off confusion, not more attenuated 
forms such as confusion over affiliation or momentary initial-interest 
confusion.218 By differentiating between these types of confusion, courts 
can simplify parody cases.219 Some direct competitors whose supposed 
parodies fall outside of expressive works might be found liable under 
this approach. As noted previously, however, there is some legitimate 
risk of phony parodies that deserve to lose because they are indeed 
engaged in passing off, and this is just where they would be found. If 
policy interests in fair competition or open communication that caused us to care about confusion in 
the first place.”). 
215. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 44, at 511; see also id. at 511–12 (discussing limitations on 
remedies more generally). 
216. See McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 69, at 254–56. 
217. See id. at 300 (“Some types of confusion are simply unlikely to lead to any real harm at all. 
Even where confusion might lead to some articulable harm, it might be a variety of harm that 
trademark law should not address—or at least not in situations where other values point in the 
opposite direction. Better differentiation between types of confusion should free courts to ignore 
some of it altogether where warranted by the importance of other values.”). 
218. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 
2004); Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(embracing a specialized test for “initial interest confusion”); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. 
Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1341–42 (2d Cir. 1975); Jennifer E. Rothman, 
Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105 
(2005). 
219. Simon’s reform proposal has a similar aim of identifying risks of core passing-off confusion 
caused by direct competitors, but the complex structure of his “presumption-infusion” test, with 
multiple elements connected to a rebuttable presumption, is aimed at accuracy not efficiency. See 
Simon, supra note 26, at 1078–85. 
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Harley-Davidson could show that the defendant’s repair shop passed 
itself off as a Harley-Davidson service,220 or Budweiser could prove that 
consumers actually thought the “Buttwiper” dog toy came from 
Budweiser,221 a court might find these parodies infringing. This makes 
perfect sense based on our goals for parody doctrine. These are the 
parodies with the least appreciable speech content and the most 
commercial motivation to fend for themselves in litigation. 
Requiring markholders to prove the nature of their injury more 
rigorously also responds to the lesson in Campbell that parody doctrine 
should relate to the central purposes of an intellectual property regime. 
Ultimately, trademark law aims to prevent unfair competition and it uses 
consumer confusion as a proxy to show where such unfairness may 
occur.222 By focusing the confusion inquiry more narrowly on risks of 
passing off, courts would reduce administrative costs, influence the 
larger narrative about judicial respect for parody—and, by the way, 
increase protection for the parodies most likely to be legitimate and least 
likely to cause troubling trademark harms. 
Finally, even in circumstances where a court believes a supposed 
parody presents some serious risk of core consumer confusion, the 
remedy may still be tailored narrowly to the asserted harm. Too often, 
courts in trademark cases with speech implications issue blanket 
injunctions rather than finding ways to allow socially beneficial speech 
while still addressing confusion.223 For instance, if a court required that 
the Buttwiper dog toy be sold in a package clearly labeled with words 
like “UNAUTHORIZED” and “PARODY,” wouldn’t that resolve any 
legitimate concerns about consumer confusion? This response requires 
that the parodist fight all the way through to an injunction and it will not 
reduce administrative costs of litigation directly. (That said, in cases 
where a supposed parody loses, we may wonder if it merited protection 
to begin with.) More notably, however, if courts demonstrated a 
tendency toward remedial modesty in parody cases, it might lend 
support to a commercial parodist who wants to respond to a demand 
letter by negotiating to add disclaimers or alter a parody in small ways 
instead of withdrawing it completely. The shadow of the law would 
encourage these parties to reach a settlement that preserved the 
220. See Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999). 
221. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. VIP Prods., LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Mo. 2008). 
222. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text (discussing the limited purposes of trademark 
law and their contrast with the purposes of copyright law).  
223. See McGeveran & McKenna, supra note 69, at 310–17 (discussing narrower possible 
remedies in speech-related trademark cases).  
 
                                                     
10 - McGeveran Returned Final Review.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2015  1:28 PM 
2015] THE IMAGINARY TRADEMARK PARODY CRISIS 753 
expressive value of parody for all of us consumers who receive it. 
In combination, this series of nets would enable streamlined 
resolution of parody cases: categorical safe harbors, artistic relevance 
and nominative use tests, a more stringent definition of core passing-off 
confusion in cases involving speech such as parody, and more tailored 
remedies in the minority of cases where such confusion is likely. Since 
courts already decide these cases effectively, the aim should be helping 
them do so efficiently, thus reducing costs and giving parodists greater 
leverage against overreaching demand letters. 
CONCLUSION 
Although it was a copyright case, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
teaches valuable lessons for the treatment of parody in trademark law. 
First, Campbell emphatically confirms the expressive value of parody, 
no matter how crude or unsubtle some may find it. This lesson has 
resonated in decided trademark cases, where previous skeptical or 
hostile attitudes toward parodies of marks have disappeared almost 
entirely, and where parodists almost always prevail over markholders. 
Second, Campbell recognizes the difficulty in calibrating a careful 
parody test because of the risk that a post hoc parody justification could 
excuse IP infringement. In both copyright and trademark law, then, it is 
better to rely on broader defensive doctrines than to craft complex 
parody-specific rules.224 Third, Campbell preaches fidelity of parody-
related defensive doctrines to the underlying purpose of an IP regime. 
Trademark law seeks to prevent consumer confusion about the 
provenance of goods in order to protect a fair and competitive 
marketplace and prevent passing off. Its parody doctrine should further 
those particular objectives. 
Combining these three specific lessons together teaches us a broader 
one about parody in trademark law: We need to change the way we talk. 
We should claim victory in litigated parody cases. The first lesson of 
Campbell shows that it is not necessary to continue refining the perfect 
defensive doctrine in this area, while the second should warn us that 
doing so multiplies harmful and unnecessary complexity. The third 
lesson reassures us that true parodies do not threaten the core values 
trademarks are supposed to protect—and that the few ersatz parodies 
which do so are rightfully enjoined. 
224. Campbell applied the Copyright Act’s fair use defense. See id. at 578–93; 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2012). As Part IV demonstrated, trademark law has a range of potential or existing broad defensive 
doctrines available.  
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By continuing to fret that contemporary trademark law mishandles 
parody, too many courts and commentators actually fuel a much greater 
problem. Judges get parody cases right, but parodists receiving cease-
and-desist demands don’t know this. They may realize, however, that 
some doctrines for handling parody, particularly the ordinary multifactor 
test for likelihood of confusion, impose high administrative costs. Let’s 
redirect our energy toward the real crisis. We must further develop fast-
lane defensive doctrines that reduce the burden of litigating parody cases 
as much as possible, such as safe harbors and a broad artistic relevance 
test. Meanwhile, we should shout the truth from the rooftops: 
Markholders who sue legitimate parodies lose. Their threats are empty. 
 
 
